On October 30 this year, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev declined to attend the latest summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), held in Ankara. During the summit, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed admitting Russia to the organization either as a full member or as an observer.
Earlier, in late September and early October, a diplomatic dispute emerged between Turkey and Azerbaijan following Baku"s decision to ban the wearing of hijabs in schools. Several representatives of Turkey"s ruling Justice and Development Party criticized the decision, prompting a backlash from the Azerbaijani side, which stated that interference in the country"s internal affairs was unacceptable. Meanwhile, in early September, Kazakhstan"s Minister of Education, Zhuldyz Suleimenova, warned schools against allowing students to wear hijabs and pointed to possible consequences for non-compliance.
Aliyev"s absence from the OTS summit and Tokayev"s proposal should be considered in the context of these developments, which point to growing divisions within the Turkic world. This article examines the underlying causes of these divisions and their possible implications for the future of Turkic cooperation.
Turkic-Style Integration
In recent years, Turkic states have made active efforts to deepen integration. In 2021, the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States was transformed into the Organization of Turkic States, elevating relations among Turkic-speaking countries to a new level. That same year, the Turkic World Vision 2040 document was adopted, outlining the long-term priorities for integration.
Its principal areas of cooperation include strengthening political solidarity, developing economic interdependence, deepening cultural and educational integration, expanding security cooperation, enhancing the international presence of Turkic states, and developing a common transport and logistics space.
In the political sphere, Turkic states have established relatively close relations, including strategic partnerships and alliances. Turkey and Azerbaijan, for instance, characterize their relationship through the formula of "one nation, two states". The strength of this partnership was particularly evident during the Second Karabakh War, when Baku received crucial support from Ankara. Economic cooperation has also been gaining momentum. By the end of 2025, trade between OTS member states had reached approximately $22–23 billion, nearly doubling over the previous five years.
Integration is also advancing in the cultural and humanitarian spheres. In 2024, Turkic states signed a memorandum on the joint development of a large language model and agreed on a common Latin-based alphabet consisting of 34 letters. Several cultural and humanitarian institutions have also been established within the OTS framework, including the Union of Turkic Universities, which brings together approximately 170 higher education institutions; the International Turkic Academy; the International Organization of Turkic Culture (TURKSOY); and the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation.
Cooperation among Turkic states in the security sphere is developing just as actively. In 2021, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed the Shusha Declaration on Allied Relations, which effectively constitutes a military-political alliance. Ankara has made a significant contribution to the modernization and strengthening of Azerbaijan"s military capabilities, a contribution that became particularly evident during the Second Karabakh War.
Turkey is also actively developing military-technical cooperation with the Turkic-speaking countries of Central Asia. The parties are concluding agreements on the joint production of defense equipment, while Central Asian states are acquiring Turkish military hardware. Kyrgyzstan, for example, has reportedly acquired all four types of Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – Bayraktar TB2, Aksungur, Akıncı, and ANKA – which would make it the only country besides Turkey itself to possess the full range of combat drones manufactured by Ankara.
Despite these developments, the events mentioned at the beginning of this article have exposed a number of contradictions within the Turkic world. If left unresolved, these tensions could lead not only to further divisions but potentially to confrontation among its members.
Islamic and Secular Visions of Turkism
As noted above, the recent tensions between Azerbaijan and Turkey were linked to Baku"s decision to ban the wearing of hijabs in schools. This episode highlighted differences between Ankara and the post-Soviet Turkic states in their approaches to the organization of public and political life.
Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, came to power, Turkey has witnessed a gradual Islamization of its public and political life. In contemporary Turkey, the Islamic factor plays a defining role in the country"s political trajectory. Ankara"s aspirations to become a global power are closely linked to this factor, while the promotion of a Turkish model of Islam is viewed as an instrument for strengthening its international standing.
The post-Soviet Turkic states, by contrast, regard political Islam as a potential threat to the secular model of governance they have sought to consolidate since gaining independence. They also view political Islam as a possible instrument of external influence and interference in their domestic affairs. For this reason, over the past 35 years, these countries have sought to limit the influence of religion on political processes and maintain state control over the religious sphere. It could be argued that they perceive this issue as existential, leaving little room for compromise.
Consequently, the two sides maintain largely uncompromising positions on the role of Islam in society and politics. This fundamental difference has a significant impact on their relations and prospects for closer integration.
The Turkic World and Israel
Another potential fault line among Turkic states concerns their relations with Israel. It is worth recalling that, during Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu"s address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 24 this year, Azerbaijan"s representative, unlike many other delegates, remained in the chamber rather than walking out.
This provoked widespread criticism in the Turkish media. During his address, Netanyahu also made strongly critical remarks about the Turkish president. More broadly, relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv have reached a critically low point due to their conflicting interests in the Middle East, particularly over the Palestinian issue.
On October 14, Baku hosted another summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), which was attended by Israeli President Isaac Herzog. During his visit, Herzog met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and described relations between the two countries as "excellent". At the same time, representatives of 14 of the organization"s 28 member states walked out during Herzog"s address at the summit, while Iran"s representative called for Israel"s expulsion from the organization.
In April this year, Israeli President Isaac Herzog was received in Astana by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. The meeting took place amid escalating tensions surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the outbreak of the war between the United States and Israel against Iran, developments that had contributed to Tel Aviv"s growing international isolation. Earlier, in November 2025, Kazakhstan joined the so-called Abraham Accords, which are aimed at establishing diplomatic relations between Muslim-majority countries and Israel and helping to overcome the latter"s diplomatic isolation.
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are seeking to establish pragmatic relations with Tel Aviv. According to some estimates, the two countries together account for nearly 70% of Israel"s oil imports. Baku and Astana pursue several objectives through their engagement with Israel:
– To leverage the influence of the Israeli lobby in their relations with the United States;
– To gain access to Israeli technologies and investment;
– To strengthen their positions in the Middle Eastern energy market.
As noted above, however, these relations do not align with Ankara"s interests and are becoming another source of division within the Turkic world.
A New "Big Brother"?
Another fundamental factor that could deepen divisions among Turkic states is the question of leadership and the potential imposition of a regional hierarchy. This issue is particularly sensitive for the post-Soviet Turkic countries, which are highly protective of their sovereignty and wary of excessive dependence on any single external power or attempts to influence their domestic and foreign policy decision-making. For this reason, these countries have increasingly sought to develop broad networks of relations with different centers of power.
Having only recently moved beyond the hierarchical relationship with Moscow, in which the Kremlin played the role of an "elder brother" these states have little interest in establishing a similar hierarchy in their relations with Ankara. On the contrary, their engagement with Turkey is also intended to provide opportunities to balance the influence of traditional major partners and expand their diplomatic room for maneuver. Any attempts to interfere in their internal affairs, particularly on fundamental issues such as religion, are likely to be met with considerable resistance.
Kazakh President Tokayev"s proposal to admit Russia to the OTS should be viewed in this context. Through this initiative, Tokayev signaled to Ankara that the organization"s members could pursue alternatives to the Turkish foreign policy orientation. It could even be argued that he invoked a kind of "reverse Kremlin principle," whereby partnership with Moscow is viewed as a means of balancing the influence of other centers of power rather than as a threat to national sovereignty.
Big and Small Pan-Turkism: Prospects for Division
The factors outlined above reveal the emerging fault lines within the Turkic world. For the purposes of this analysis, I distinguish between two tendencies, which I refer to as "big" and "small" Pan-Turkism.
The former represents an aspiration toward the unity of Turkic states under the potential leadership of Turkey. The latter, by contrast, describes an approach adopted by countries within the Turkic world that seek to safeguard their sovereignty and use the integration framework to advance their own national interests. Azerbaijan, for example, attached particular importance to the support of OTS member states, especially Turkey, during the Second Karabakh War.
The growing influence of these factors on relations among Turkic states could eventually lead to divisions within the organization and even to confrontation between its members. In my assessment, there is little prospect of these underlying factors disappearing in either the medium or long term, since they are deeply embedded in the state-building processes of Turkic countries and shape their respective national interests.
As the examples cited at the beginning of this article demonstrate, these factors are already exerting an increasingly significant influence on relations among Turkic states. This suggests that contradictions within the Turkic world may intensify in the near future. In other words, it will become increasingly difficult for these countries to find common ground and deepen their integration.